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Abstract
The debacle of the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998 brought significant 
change to Indonesia’s public sector. Primary and secondary education since 1 January 
2001 has been based on the new law about regional autonomy, and administered 
at district level rather than in the previously centralised and bureaucratic manner. 
At the school level, ideas about school autonomy emerged and became popular. In 
particular, the term ‘School Based Management’ (SBM) was seen as a panacea, and 
as a result, the central government issued a regulation to implement the practice of 
SBM. This article analyses the dynamics of the SBM policy as it was interpreted and 
implemented. The study was approached in two ways: through document analysis of 
the Ministry of National Education decree 044/U/2002 that promulgated SBM; and 
by soliciting and interpreting the perspectives and practices of stakeholders at district 
level through interviews, site studies and document analyses. The study found that 
the SBM policy as stated in the decree lacked clarity. The decree had been hastily 
introduced and emphasised structural changes at district and school levels without 
clarifying its underlying rationale or implementation guidelines. 
Introduction
The Asian financial crisis, which started in June 1997, had different 
effects in Indonesia. University students demonstrated around the 
country and public pressure led to the replacement of President Suharto 
in May 1998. Five months after Suharto stepped down, the World 
Bank released a report titled Education in Indonesia: From Crisis to 
Recovery. It noted that the state of Indonesia’s education system 
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was very poor, reflected in such indicators as a high drop-out rates, 
low school participation rates, and low student achievement. One 
of the suggestions in the report was to improve education through a 
decentralisation policy. As a consequence, the National Development 
Planning Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (Bappenas), together 
with the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), with funding from 
the World Bank, established several task forces to find ways to improve 
Indonesia’s education (Jalal and Musthafa, 2001). 
Meanwhile, during the Habibie administration, the Indonesian 
parliament passed two new laws relating to regional autonomy: law 
22 of 1999, which involved devolution of political authority, and 
law 25 of 1999, which was about fiscal balance. Aspinall and Fealy 
(2003, p. 3) observed that these developments produced ‘one of the 
most radical decentralisation programmes attempted anywhere in the 
world’. This is because within two years, significant authority was to 
be devolved to more than 360 district governments from the previously 
highly centralised control from the capital, Jakarta.1 The introduction 
of new regulations regarding local government autonomy, which 
became effective in January 2001, also meant that policy decisions 
in the education sector (that is, K–12) could now largely be made by 
government at the district (kabupaten or kota) level. 
The two developments above were the causes of the initiation of the new 
policies in Indonesian education system that had to be applied in the 
context of regional autonomy. This article explains the decentralisation 
issue with regard to education sector, and the history of school-based 
management policy and its implementation in one district in Nusa 
Tenggara Province. 
Education Decentralisation framework
The education decentralisation policy can be seen as a popular policy that 
has been implemented in many parts of the world since the 1970s. It can 
be identified in developed and developing countries (Bulock and Thomas, 
1 That was the number in 1999, as of 2009, the number of district is more than 460.
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1997; Abu-Duhou, 1999; Fullan and Watson, 2000). This policy has been 
initiated by democratic governments in Australia and the United States 
(Murphy and Beck, 1995), by autocratic military regimes in Argentina 
and Chile (Fiske, 1996; Schieffelbein and Schieffelbein, 2000) and even 
in China, a country with a rigid centralisation ideology (Hawkins, 2000).
The implementation of education decentralisation varies in term of 
scale. It happens at district level in Edmonton, Canada (Brown, 1990); at 
the state level in Victoria, Australia (Abu-Duhou, 1999); and nationally 
in the United Kingdom (Bulock and Thomas, 1997) and New Zealand 
(Wylie, 1995). Consequently, the many varieties of the policy make it 
difficult to generalise. However, in general terms, decentralisation is 
about shifting authority and responsibility from one level of government 
to a lower one. Nevertheless, the term decentralisation does not have an 
exact single meaning that is easily understood by all who practise it. So 
it is helpful to explain the concept by considering four dimensions of 
emphasis: (1) degree of transfer, (2) breadth of transfer, (3) location of 
transfer, and (4) functions transferred.
The degree of transfer within public institutions is in three categories: 
deconcentration, delegation, and devolution (Rondinelli, Nellis 
and Cheema, 1983). According to Abu-Duhou (1999, p. 24–25) 
deconcentration is ‘the handing over [of] some amount of administrative 
authority or responsibility to lower levels within central government 
ministries and agencies, and it is a shifting of the workloads from 
centrally located officials to staff or offices of the regional capital or 
centre’. This is the weakest form or degree of power transfer because 
the centre doesn’t devolve power. Delegation refers to the transfer of 
decision-making authority and managerial responsibility for certain 
functions or tasks from a higher to lower level, which remain indirectly 
controlled by a central government. Last, as defined by Rondinelli et al. 
(1983, p. 2) devolution is ‘the creation or strengthening—financially 
or legally—of sub-national units of governments, the activities of which 
are substantially outside the direct control of the central government’. 
This means, devolution is the far-reaching form of decentralisation, and 
the one in which most transfer of power is involved. It is intended to 
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be permanent and cannot be withdrawn without some legal justification 
(Brown, 1990). 
Regarding breadth of transfer, the decentralisation that was introduced 
in Indonesia during Reformasi was massive, involving nearly all 
public sectors at the district level, except for the monetary and fiscal 
sectors, defence and security, foreign affairs, justice and religion, which 
remained in the hands of the central government in the capital (Jalal 
and Musthafa, 2001). Other countries experienced decentralisation in 
one or two sectors such as in education and health (Burki, Perry and 
Dillinger, 1999).
The transfer of authority in the education sector can take place at 
several sub-national levels. In the case of New Zealand, one goal of its 
decentralisation policy was to eliminate the middle management level 
to ensure that the central government was linked directly to the schools 
(Wylie, 1995). Whereas in Victoria, Australia, education remains under 
the jurisdiction of the state government, but some authority has been 
transferred to the school level (Abu-Duhou, 1999). In another situation, 
Davies et al. (2003) observed that in Malaŵi, the transfer of power in 
education is from the central government to the district level. 
Related to the transfer of functions, there are a number of possibilities, 
including giving all functions to schools or sharing each function with 
separate levels of government. Such functions as personnel management, 
testing, procurement, curriculum, student management, financing, 
training, to name a few, are performed by government institutions. A 
study by Rideout and Ural (1993) shows the distribution of functions 
in ten developed and developing countries, as the functions relate to 
decision making. The study indicates that some significant decisions 
are still made by the central government. Examples included school 
organisational structure, minimum requirements and official languages 
used in teaching and some others. On the other hand, management 
functions, such as discipline and teacher evaluations, are undertaken at 
the school level.
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Power and Authority
According to Daun (2002), there is a paradox when central governments 
decentralise particular powers. This is because decentralisation and 
other restructuring is always initiated from above. On the one hand, it 
seems logical for power to be at the top level of government but, on the 
other hand, it can also make sense for power to be devolved to lower 
levels. But it is the concepts of power and authority that are at the heart 
of decentralisation, if the transferring of power is to make sense. Weber, 
in his classic sociological analysis of power, notes that besides power 
there two other important concepts: authority and legitimacy.
Power, in simple terms, refers to the ability to do something or to have 
control over people and activities. When ‘power is granted by consent’ 
(Nieuwenhuis, 2004, p. 4) it is what we call authority. In terms of public 
organisations, consent is obtained through a range of means, such as 
constitutions, legislation, regulation or decrees that enable people who 
hold positions to have a justification for their authority. When this 
happens, it is called legitimacy
Undoubtedly, the formulation of legislation or regulation about 
decentralisation generally arises from a political struggle at all levels of 
government. Often, the stipulated regulation is outlined to stakeholders 
as the framework that will ‘constrain and shape decisions and behaviours 
of [the] organisation’s members’ (McGinn and Welsh, 1999, p. 17). 
Wirt, Mitchell and Marshal (1985) further note that the political culture 
in a country influences the process of policy development as well as the 
content and quality of education policies. Consequently, the nature of a 
regulation that allocates power to some levels but not others reflects the 
social reality of power within the society. Gershberg (1999) proposes 
that there are two strategic choices in terms of legislating for education 
reform: one is a situation with high legislative involvement where a 
certain legal framework is processed that involves political procedures, 
and the other has a low legislative involvement where change in schools 
is not based on specific legislations. 
The forms of power and authority that are formulated in terms of 
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decentralisation regulations often have potential for creating conflicts, 
confusion and misunderstandings. According to Daun (2002, p. 80) this 
is because ‘(i) the unclear definition of who decides what; and (ii) the 
interpretation of the new rules’. In agreement, Elmore (in Daun, 2002) 
in the United States and Wylie (1995) in New Zealand both noted that 
ambiguity is often seen regarding the responsibility and authority of 
various levels of governance. Consequently, Fulan and Watson (2000) 
suggest that to avoid confusion and tension at implementation, it is 
desirable that there be clarity in the formulation of rules, regulations 
and decision-making authority.
Method
This research used qualitative inquiry methods to identify and analyse 
the policy and practice of school-based management in Indonesian 
education.  Several methods were used to collect data and analyse 
it. Documents relating to national and district-level school-based 
management policies were analysed. The analysis and discussion 
about regulations at national level pertained to the Ministry of National 
Education decree 044/U/2002. This included an analysis of the reasons 
for, and the preamble to, the decree. The content of the policy and its 
explanations in the decree’s appendixes, guidelines and other publications 
from the central office were critically examined. To put the policy in 
perspective, the researcher used data from the literature review in the 
analysis. The decree, after ten years of the reform, is undoubtedly still 
the only operational regulation relating to school-based management 
issues, even after the promulgation of new education laws and several 
education standards.
Interviews were carried out at district and school levels. Respondents 
for interview at district level were from district education offices, were 
members of district parliaments, school supervisors, education council 
members, teachers’ union officials and officials from Mataram’s 
mayoral office. Four principals, six teachers and four school committee 
members also participated in interviews as representatives from school 
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level. The audio-recorded data from interviews were transcribed. 
findings and Discussion
The official move to SBM for Indonesian schools was not made, 
however, until after the release of the Minister of National Education 
decree (kepmendiknas) 044/U/2002, concerning school committees 
and education councils. The kepmendiknas was one of the most awaited 
decrees in the history of Indonesia’s education. Officially the decree 
was released on 2 April 2002 and signed by A Malik Fajar, the then 
Minister of National Education (MoNE, 2002). The history of the 
decree, however, can be traced back nearly three and a half years before, 
when the World Bank published a report about the performance of 
Indonesia’s education. The possibility of greater school autonomy was 
further explored by the government, which formed several task forces 
following the World Bank report. Upon publication of the task forces’ 
progress reports in early July 2000, the public perception was positive. 
It appeared that the general public had welcomed and supported the idea 
of school-based management (Kompas, 2000). In their final report, the 
task forces wrote explicitly about the implementation of school-based 
management, ‘�aws and regulations need to be prepared to support the 
idea of school decentralisation in the form of school-based management’ 
(Jalal and Mustafa, 2001, p. 126).
The Kepmendiknas
The preamble to the decree states that the reason for the regulation is to 
facilitate society’s participation in education, and the decree is needed 
to create a new institutional structure. So the decree was intended to 
set up a new kind of organisation, and formed the legal basis for doing 
this. The contents of the decree are very short, consisting of only four 
articles (see Table 1). The first article deals with the formation of a new 
organisation in every district and educational institution. The second 
article gives suggestions about how to form those organisations. The 
third article mentions a specific decree from the past that is no longer 
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valid. The last article outlines when the decree is to come into force. 
Table . Contents of the MoNE decree 044/U/00
Article 
(1)  In each district is formed an Education Council, as an initiative 
from the society and/or the district government.
(2)  In each education institution or group of education institutions 
is formed a School Committee as an initiative from the society, 
educational institution and/or the district government.
Article 
The formation of the Education Council and School Committee 
can be used the guide line for formation of Education Council 
and School Committee as attached in the Appendix I and II of 
this decree.
Article 3
With effect of this decree, then the decree of Ministry of Education 
and Culture No 0293/U/1993 of 1993 regarding the formation of 
Board of Education Assistance is abolished.
Article 4
This decree is effective on the date stipulated.
In paragraph (1) of Article 1, there are two aspects that are mentioned 
explicitly: the creation of a new organisation, an education council, at 
district level, and who may establish it. There is no explanation available 
about this new institution, nothing about its functions, tasks, role and 
authority, not even about who are the intended clients of the education 
council. The only clear aspect is the name of the organisation. Although 
in the next section, there is mention of the guidelines that can be used 
to form the organisation, the details are not stated explicitly in the body 
of the decree. This can be taken to mean that there is no clear legal 
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standing for the parties who are involved. 
In the latter part of paragraph (1), the decree states that a new organisation 
has to be formed. However, it does not specify who is responsible for 
establishing the organisation. It could be either the district government or 
local society or possibly both. This latter situation can occur in a district 
that has more than one education council, and can result in a problem of 
legitimacy. In addition, the term ‘society’, as used, is also problematic, 
because its meaning is legally unclear. The decree does not give specific 
and clear meanings about who may be involved in constituting the 
new body. Without that, the formulation of responsibilities can lead to 
tensions between society and the district government. On one hand, 
the new organisation may want to facilitate societal participation in 
education but, on the other, the district government has a legal right to 
be involved and to steer the change process.
Regarding paragraph (2) of Article 1, there may also be a legal 
complication here. First, by using the term ‘educational institution’, the 
decree is imposing a uniform model of a new organisation. Regardless 
of their status, whether state or private schools, or schooling levels, 
education institutions have to establish a school committee. �ater, 
appearing in the decree’s appendix, the obligation to establish a new 
organisation also extends to pre-school education (kindergarten), out-
of-school education, and even to institutions in the Islamic education 
system, public or private Islamic schools. This kind of one-size-fits-
all policy is remarkable, because denying school status in the reality 
of diverse situations shows that the designers did not understand 
the complexities and may not have given enough careful thought to 
institutional arrangements. It seems the decree wants to ensure all kinds 
of societal participation at the school level are of a standard pattern. In 
this respect, the decree is crossing into the spheres of other ministry 
interventions (particularly the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which 
controls and manages the Islamic school system). This is unusual 
because the decree is the lowest regulation that can be promulgated by 
the central government, yet it has been portrayed as having far-reaching 
implications.
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In other countries, like New Zealand (Wyle, 1995), structural change 
in school organisations can only take place in public schools where 
the government supports these institutions with public funds. Private 
schools in Indonesia are minimally supported by the government (see, 
for example, Bangay, 2005), but the decree does not acknowledge this 
differentiation between private and public schools. 
Furthermore, paragraph (2) of Article 1 of the decree is problematic in 
terms of who has responsibility for establishing a school committee,. For 
instance, three parties have a right to constitute the school committee. 
It could be formed by local society, the educational institution or the 
district government. Furthermore, establishing a committee can also be 
achieved through a combination of two or more of the three parties 
cooperating. Obviously, it opens up the possibility of a competition that 
can lead also to a legitimacy problem, if more than one school committee 
is formed in one school. The consequences can be confusing, as when, 
for example, a district government introduces a decree that imposes 
a school committee for every private school at secondary level. The 
private school cannot refuse the school committee regulation imposed 
on it because the district government has the capacity and legitimacy to 
implement the decree. 
In Article 2 another peculiar aspect is also evident. It mentions that when 
a party wants to establish an education council and school committee 
it can refer to the decree’s appendixes. The phrase ‘can be used’ in the 
Article shows that this decree is a ‘hesitant regulation’. 2 This means 
that each party does not have any obligation to follow this decree and 
its appendixes, therefore they can establish the new organisation in 
their own ways. So while it is probable that one party might establish 
a school committee with clear, detailed and appropriate processes, it is 
also possible that a party with power can establish a committee for its 
own purposes. 
The wording of the second Article exposes the real political will of 
the central government for the SBM implementation. It seems that the 
2 Translated from the Indonesian bisa digunakan, which means voluntary, to be used if one 
thinks it is useful. 
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policy makers in the central office do not fully support the ideas of 
school autonomy and local education governance. The central office 
documents implicitly acknowledge that the decree can be bypassed if 
district or school stakeholders intend not to comply. The decree itself 
therefore states explicitly a loophole that could to be used by those with 
reservations about SBM. 
However, the last two Articles in the decree have clearer meanings 
and are more straightforward. No other interpretations will follow 
regarding the legal base of BP3 (board of educational assistance) in 
each school, which, under Article 3, has to be abolished. The intention 
explicitly to put an end to the BP3 regulation is to ensure that only one 
organisation is to facilitate societal participation at the school level, and 
this organisation is the school committee. In this way, any unwanted 
competition or conflicts between the school committee and the BP3 are 
eliminated. This change also signalled that the rules of the game have 
also changed and that practices under the BP3 are no longer accepted.
In general, the first two Articles, the important parts of the decree, are 
ambiguous. They do not have clear meanings and their underlying 
rationale has not been explained, thereby creating potential confusion 
because of possible multiple interpretations during implementation. 
This lack of clarity is a serious weakness (Fulan and Watson, 2000).
The decree reflects the inability of the central government, in particular 
the MoNE, to position the education sector in the right place, within 
the context of the autonomy law (law 22 of 1999). The changes 
also demanded that the central office change its role from being an 
implementer of policy to being a regulator. In the autonomy era, the 
central office personnel seem do not have any experience or clear ideas 
regarding these changes (World Bank, 2004). 
The Decree’s Appendixes
In contrast to the content of the decree, which is brief, the appendixes 
are much more detailed regarding the education council and the school 
committee. As stated in the previous section, such a situation has led to 
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the assumption that the policy makers themselves are uncertain about 
the new organisations that have to be established in every district and 
school around the country. Other interpretations are possible; it may be 
that the MoNE does not want to impose a regulation that may be at odds 
with district authorities. At the same time, by introducing the decree, a 
degree of technical and legal guidance is provided to school and district 
governments that do not have the capacity to formulate such regulations. 
Again, it must be stated that according to Article 2, the provisions of the 
appendixes are not compulsory for education authorities. 
There are two appendixes that accompany the decree. The first outlines 
guidelines for establishing education councils; and the second, guidelines 
for starting school committees. Although the appendixes relate to 
organisations at different levels (district and school) and for different 
purposes, both are remarkably similar in its structure and content. 
The first section defines an education council as ‘a body which provides 
a place for societal participation in order to improve quality, equity 
and efficiency of education management in a district’. The phrase 
‘provides a place’ implies that this new organisation is to create space 
and opportunity for members of the public to participate particularly 
in education matters. Further, it is also expected that any contributions 
should be useful and should lead to educational excellence. It appears 
that the education council is expected to have a direct role in improving 
quality when this is a primary task for the government itself. This means 
there is a hidden agenda embedded in the formulation of the decree, 
which is to make the general public take some responsibility for tasks 
that belong to the education bureaucracy. 
From the third section, on the aims of the education council, several 
things seem clear although also open to question. First, the three 
stated objectives seem merely to serve to provide a greater clarity 
of definition for the education council. The document stipulates 
that education quality can be reached when the council facilitates 
and channels societal aspirations and initiatives through policy and 
programmes. In relation to equity, the document states that the council 
can achieve this by ‘increasing responsibility and active participation 
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from all layers of society in education implementation’. In relation to 
efficiency the document encourages ‘creating ambience and conditions 
for transparency, accountability, and democracy’. On the one hand, the 
document seems to state objectives that encourage education councils to 
undertake certain tasks, but on the other hand the policy is not responsive 
to public needs and dynamics because agendas from elements of society 
are not included or are not easily facilitated. 
Secondly, critical analysis of the objectives of education councils, 
as stated in the third section is important to ascertain the extent of 
potential success for the new body. However, this is difficult because 
the objectives in the appendixes are normatively written and difficult to 
put into operation and assess.
In the fourth section, roles and functions are outlined. Roles for the 
council include it being an advisory agency, supporting agency, 
controlling agency and mediator. Except for the supporting and 
controlling functions, the other roles are standard ones. However, in 
relation to the council’s second role ‘as a supporting agency in terms 
of financial, thinking and labour in educational implementation’, this 
appears to miss the point for establishing education councils. This 
is because the supporting role referred to in the decree is not a role 
that is to be played by the council, but rather it is an executive role 
(that belongs to a district government). In other words, it seems that 
the decree has intended to swap government obligations relating to a 
core issue (education funding) to the education council. Further, if the 
council were to play a supporting role, without further legal guidelines 
on what this means, then it would seem that the decree is just to make 
education councils act as charities to fund educational activities in the 
district. 
There seems to be a misfit between the espoused controlling agency role 
of an education council, ‘in terms of transparency and accountability of 
education implementation and outcome’, and the nature and location of 
this kind of organisation. This is because, as shown in the listed functions 
of the council, none particularly gives the council the right ‘to control or 
manage’ educational implementation and outcome (World Bank, 2004, 
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p. 9). Again, this is another ambiguous section of the decree, which can 
result in tensions and possibly create confusion in the field.
The appendixes stipulate that the education council conducts cooperative 
work with local government and parliament, and encourages parents’ 
involvement to improve education quality. The stipulations are, 
however, too broad, not sufficiently focused, and none of the tasks 
are clearly stated. Take the first function for instance, which states 
that an education council’s role is to increase ‘society’s attention and 
commitment for quality education implementation’. The terms ‘attention’ 
and ‘commitment’ are difficult as yardsticks, particularly when these 
relate to ‘quality education implementation’, which is a never-ending 
process. Thus, in reality, it is difficult to perform tasks such as those 
stipulated when the audience is society at large. It therefore seems that 
these functions are immeasurable, making it impossible to gauge the 
success or failure of a council.
A closer scrutiny of the council’s list of roles and functions reveals 
that there is no mention of authority. Without a clear authority, it is 
impossible for the council to make decisions and recommendations that 
are binding for interrelated institutions such as the local government 
and parliament. 
The appendixes on the forming of Education Councils seem to favour 
the holders of power, which is the local government. The stipulations 
give authority to the local government to manage the teacher selection 
process, and establish the decree that is to be signed by the head of 
district. In this way any opposition is silenced and simultaneously 
ensures that the council becomes subordinate to the bureaucracy. 
In the seventh section regarding inter-organisation arrangements, the 
education council’s relations with other organisations at district level 
are presented. These diagrams are important because they show a 
clear vision of what is intended. It seems that the intention in creating 
education councils is to create a body for governance at the district 
level. However, the local parliament is already in existence. It would 
be clear if, in the structural arrangements, the clients for the education 
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council are shown. As it stands now, it is unclear which institutions 
really are the clients of education councils. It is unclear if the client is 
the local parliament (legislative) or the local government (executive). 
Having two clients to serve is problematic and can lead to confusion for 
the council itself. When the council’s client is the legislature, then the 
council has to support the work of the local parliament in a supervisory 
role. Such a role, as an advisory agency to the local parliament makes 
sense, unlike a relationship with the executive.
In the closing section of the appendixes, it stipulates that the council 
‘can be regulated’ by legislation. Again, the word ‘can’ implies that 
this is not mandatory and may be ignored. Moreover, to subject the 
council to regulation through legislation is inconsistent with education 
management under decentralisation and school-based management 
issues. This is because the council is part of governance and not 
management with the local government having full authority. 
Implementation at District Level
Starting from early 2001, each district in Indonesia had been managing 
the public sector authority, which was generally bigger than those 
managed by the central and the provincial governments. In terms of the 
education sector, there were three significant aspects of decentralisation 
of management by the district government: institutional and personnel 
conditions, finance, and curriculum. One instrument that can measure 
education policy at the district level is the district regulation (peraturan 
daerah or perda). The regulation can be proposed either by the executive 
or legislature, but it needs to be discussed extensively in the legislative 
forum by both parties. Unlike several districts that have released 
regulations based on the MoNE decree regarding the education council 
and school committee, the Municipal City of Mataram has not released 
any.3 Official reports from the Law Division of the Mataram City 
3 The Municipal City of Malang, East Java, promulgated district regulation 13 of 2001 on 
20 October 2001 about System of Educational Implementation in the City of Malang; The 
Municipal City of Bandung, West Java, promulgated district regulation20 of 2002 on 2 May 
2002 about Educational Implementation in City of Bandung; The District of Dompu, in the 
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Secretariat of the Mayor’s Office (from 2000 to 200) did not indicate 
any district education regulations. This implies that the legislative 
vision about district education in the autonomy era has not been readily 
realised. By contrast, there were 39 of 75 district regulations that were 
released between 2000 and 2004 that were concerned with local taxation 
in order to increase income for the district government. As noted by two 
respondents, from the mayor’s office and a school supervisor, it was the 
executive not the legislature that proposed the regulation.
So far, I’ve seen that most of the district regulations are the executive’s 
initiatives.
The mayor’s office is the main source of district regulations; the legislature 
did not get involved much and mostly agreed with proposed initiatives.
Regulations relating to local taxes increased significantly after 
autonomy was implemented throughout Indonesia because most district 
governments were concerned they might not balance their budgets. This 
had also occurred in Mataram where, since 2001, more than half of the 
regulations issued were about local taxes. 
Besides the legislative body, the district parliament is divided into 
several special commissions dedicated to a particular sector. In 
Mataram, the education sector in the legislature is administered by 
the E Commission, which comprises six district lawmakers from five 
political parties. Generally, members of this commission are perceived 
as more competent and are aware of education issues. When conducting 
fieldwork research to collect data for this study (three years after the 
autonomy; and 20 months since the MoNE decree), I noted that there were 
no decisions about school-based management and educational services 
from the commission. The most frequent activity of the E Commission 
same province as Mataram, promulgated district regulation 19 of 2002 on 30 December 
2002 about Education Councils and School Committees. All those regulations, except 
Malang’s, are similar in structure and content to the MoNE decree 044/U/2002, which 
shows little effort was made when crafting the regulations. But, of course, these show real 
concern by the legislature about the education sector with regulation as an instrument of 
policy. 
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was hearings, which were based on an official request to them from the 
district education office, school supervisors or the education council. 
This implies that implementation steps and initiatives regarding the 
education sector were originating with the executive. 
A number of interviews with several stakeholders were undertaken at 
the district level. This included ascertaining the personal views and 
interests of the district lawmaker. This confirmed that the legislator 
and indeed the E Commission seemingly had little understanding of 
education. The comments below came from school a supervisor and 
education district official respectively.
In my opinion, the district parliament, particularly the members of the 
E Commission don’t know about the substance of education issues. In 
most cases they only consider the budget aspect. 
Researcher: What has the legislature suggested to your office?
Participant: They have concerns about social development issues including 
education. However, the concern is only rhetoric. Essentially, they don’t 
understand most education issues. Most of them did not graduate from 
formal secondary schooling; So, how can they understand the issues?
These views were also reflected somewhat in the response by the 
lawmaker. Several questions directed to the legislator (such as executive 
responsibility to education sector, regulation and policy) were not 
responded to as was expected. The participant’s responses were as 
follows.
[Regarding the executive concern] Firstly, we try to make the education 
sector in the district budget reach a 20 per cent proportion. Secondly, we 
support acceleration of classes at general secondary school level, which 
should not only shorten the years of schooling from three years to two 
years, but also increase the number of subjects that have to be given to 
students. So, in those two years students learn not only 10 subjects, but 15, 
even 20 subjects. That’s what I call acceleration. 
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[Regarding regulation and policy] I see that the district government already 
has a good concern for education, even though in terms of action it does 
not. So we as the legislative body always apply political pressure. The 
real obstacle of course is about funding. We do not have much flexibility 
because of limited resources.
Such lack of understanding possibly accounted for the lack of 
promulgated regulations. The extent of knowledge and competency in 
the education sector seem to be related to the inactivity of the members 
of parliament. The quality of legislators is certainly one of the serious 
problems that the district faces particularly when parliament’s response 
has not occurred. A confirmation from one school committee member 
reflects this issue.
In this autonomy era, the parliament and the E Commission particularly 
are having substantial authority, no doubt about that. But, if they do not 
understood education, what can we say? It is a problematic situation that 
cannot be solved except by another general election.
In the absence of specific district regulations on education and 
recommendations from the education commission or the district 
parliament, information about implementation of educational 
decentralisation can be gathered from Mataram’s education district 
office and education council. 
Regarding the school-based management policy, which became the 
official policy based on the MoNE decree, the district education office 
also did not have clear directions. The only indication that explicitly 
appeared was the training programme for school committee members, as 
listed in the district budget. The training was for 200 school committee 
members to improve their knowledge. However, it was late in coming 
(two years after the introduction of school committees) and was also 
conducted in a manner that reminded everyone of the power issues. One 
respondent, a school supervisor, noted:
What I see in this particular training is that the district education office 
wants to show that it has the real power. The district office wants to show 
that the school committees are subordinate. The office uses the training to 
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impress on trainers that the activity is funded and organised by the office. 
Several respondents from the secondary school level commented about 
the district education office policy in negative terms. A school principal 
commented:
What I see of the education bureaucrats is that, for the most part, they 
don’t understand comprehensively that school-based management is about 
educational change. Previously all instructions came from the central 
office in Jakarta, then it was controlled at the local level. Nowadays, 
those roles should be facilitated and monitored by bureaucrats. However, 
I see that many district office working programmes are positioned by the 
bureaucrats and that schools are required to follow everything, not giving 
any flexibility. In terms of technical matters, we are always giving the 
bureaucrats academic–professional arguments in order to make them not 
force us, but they usually counter it with authoritative and political reasons, 
which of course do not always match.
A school committee member who had years of experience as a BP3 
member also had similar views.
Currently, as they said, we practise school based management ideas, but in 
reality this is not fully SBM because many things are still decided by them. 
For instance, in terms of teacher selection, it should be that the school has 
the right to do that, but the bureaucrats are not allowing this to happen. 
A school supervisor explained this situation in terms of the structural 
limitation. He concluded that:
I see some kind of a gap between school and district education officials. 
In terms of SBM the mode of thinking of education bureaucrats is not as 
fast as teachers and principals want. That is why from my point of view, I 
believe that the district education office should not be involved in technical 
matters in education. They must not be organising technical activities. They 
can play effectively in terms of policy and support for schools.
One issue that is more salient for district education offices is about 
power and authority. With the beginning of the shift to autonomy in 
JURNAL-vol-2.indd   59 6/4/2010   13:47:08
60
articles
2001, there was tension between the Mataram education office and the 
provincial education office. The sources of tension were related to a 
number of issues: personnel, finance and materials; the appointment of 
principals at state schools; and permission for teachers to attend training 
outside the province (Lombok Post, 2001). The Mataram district office 
perceived that what the province office had ‘a tendency to sustain an old 
paradigm’ (Lombok Post, 2001). Eventually authority came to rest at the 
district level. This experience has meant officials from the province’s 
education office often face difficulties when dealing with the Mataram 
district education office. A comment from a teacher explains this as 
follows.
Officials from the provincial education office said that when they want 
to ask something from Mataram district education office, they often find 
it very difficult. They have to edit the language of their letters in order 
to make them appear not to be perceived as giving instructions. In other 
words, the language they use is not like a command, otherwise the district 
office will not reply to the letters. 
The feeling of a ‘new centre’ emerging after the transfer of power 
(via the autonomy law) was undeniable. This appeared more salient 
in the education sector, which was the largest ‘industry’ in the district. 
It employed teachers and administrative staff that were the largest 
proportion of civil servants and it used a significant amount of the 
government budget for salary. The power shift was easily recognised by 
education district officials. They also were more aware that they could 
now do many things that previously had been inhibited by the provincial 
office. This attitude also affected Mataram’s education council
Officially, the education council was established by Mataram mayor 
decree 253/VI/2002 issued on 5 June 2002. This means it was only two 
months after the release of the MoNE decree requiring the setting up of 
education councils in each district. The rapid response and smoothness 
of the process to create an education council at Mataram was something 
that indicated interference from the government. Further, as stated by 
a member of the education council, the council was not structured and 
prepared via an official preparation committee as dictated by the MoNE 
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decree. A comment from an education council board member explained 
as follows.
First, several government officials, including the head of the district 
education office called Mr X to talk about the people best suited as 
education council members. Then, they got some names and called the 
candidates to ask about their willingness to join. Following that, there was 
a meeting where the head of the district education office explained the 
education council, based on the decree, and its tasks. Finally, the Mataram 
education council was formed with its board members. Then, based on 
acclamation, Mr X become the head of the education council. 
This shoulder-tapping method to decide the head of the education 
council by the education bureaucrats was something that was expected. 
Moreover, this demonstrates how the education council members were 
handpicked jointly by the head of the board and district education 
officials. The composition of the council was something appreciated 
by the monitoring team from the central office according to one board 
member. 
The council consists of seventeen members, as suggested by the decree 
and includes a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer. Those 
representing the society make up more than 90 per cent, though there are 
four to five bureaucrats. But not many of the bureaucrats are well equipped. 
That’s why, according to a team from the central office in Jakarta, Mataram 
education council is the best because its members are better suited as the 
decree stated.
However, the whole recruitment process invited complaints from several 
stakeholders. An explanation from a representative of a teachers union 
is typical.
What really happened was that education bureaucrats were involved deeply 
in creating education councils hastily. This means that practices that are 
necessary to establish new processes through society-based initiatives are 
only given lip service. In fact, education bureaucrats positioned many of 
their own favourite people inside the institution.
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Two members of the council gave explanations for why the institution 
was established relatively quickly. Previously in Mataram, there was 
the school council, its functions and roles were similar to the education 
council, based on the MoNE decree. However, the school council 
acted like a non-government organisation outside the district education 
office’s influence. Accordingly, it would be considered appropriate to 
create a new institution with legal backing and district influence. 
According to the council official report, several activities had been 
completed by the education council since it was formed to early 
2004. These included matters to do with the education council and 
the school committees, hearings with legislative, surveys of schools 
in Mataram regarding school committees and a seminar about the 
new curriculum. Although the council was to be given funding from 
the district government, in the past two years it was not allocated any 
funds. Consequently limited support for the education council has lead 
to complaints from two council members.
Based on the mayor’s decree the district government has clearly stated that 
every expense should be funded by the district budget, but up to now this 
is not yet seen. Fortunately, the central government has provided grants in 
the past two years to fund all activities. 
Actually we received little support from the government. We don’t 
have a secretariat. No staff are helping us even with little things such as 
office stationery. As a board member, I sometimes have to deliver letters 
personally to schools or district education offices. In short, we are inhibited 
from working effectively. 
Further, comments from some respondents suggest that the relationship 
between the district education office and the education council were not 
symmetrical as suggested by the decree. One school supervisor and a 
member of parliament directly noted what education council members 
said to them.
A board member of an education council once told me that the council is 
like a kite that is meant to fly high but the string is short. So, how can the 
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council ‘fly’ when everything is limited. In fact the council is pushed to 
become a volunteer institution by the district office. 
There is an impression that the education council is a subordinate of the 
district education office. [Researcher: Why? The education council is an 
independent organisation]. The members explicitly told me so. That’s why 
we suggested to the mayor that it should not be the district office that is the 
boss to the education council.
The above responses were not surprising to many because of the 
way the council was formed. A representative of the teacher unions 
commented:
The bureaucracy has an interest in co-opting members into each institution 
at the district level in order to preserve its power. That’s why the education 
council is needed to be part of its power structure. The council has societal 
representatives who can contribute and participate on educational issues.  
Some respondents from district and school levels had diverse views about 
the education council and its activities. A school supervisor, a principal 
and a school committee member, for instance, noted that the education 
council consisted of education experts who continue to give valuable 
input to the executive and legislative. Another teacher commented, 
however, that the education council was only a sophisticated name and 
it had little practical function at the school. A school supervisor was 
critical of the seminar organised by the council.
�ast month I found an invitation from the council regarding a seminar 
about a new curriculum. When I read the invitation, I was disappointed. 
This is not a role for the council to play. I am happy if the council facilitates 
the empowerment of society or groups of people in terms of community 
participation in education. That kind of seminar is not for the council. I 
think that the district education office is more appropriate to organise such 
a seminar. Further, I am a bit worried that members of the education council 
do not really know the key tasks of the education council itself.
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One teacher suggested that the council should be named the ‘school 
rehabilitation council’. He argued that, ‘most of the council’s job 
focussed on school rehabilitation projects, because it was required by 
the central government to liquidate the fund’. This cynical view was 
also confirmed by a board member of the council, but he also noted 
that potentially the council could play an even bigger role here when 
dealing with the district education office. To illustrate, one council 
member explained:
We also involve the district education office in several activities such as in 
block grants from the central government to refurbish school buildings; and 
scholarship grants for students who come from low-income families. The 
official letter to liquidate the fund is jointly signed between us as without 
our agreement they will not get the money. This is because the requirement 
from the central office is that the education council has to be a part of the 
committee to administer the grants. 
The explanation above indicates the tension between the district 
education office and the education council. The council had an advantage 
because it was an institution with community representatives and 
founded on regulations stipulated by the central government. However, 
as discussed, this advantage in terms of power dynamics is limited and 
infrequently demonstrated. 
Conclusion
The analyses of the school-based management regulation above 
demonstrate that the Kepmendiknas has an ambiguous conceptualisation 
but lacks clarity about governance and management regarding new 
organisational arrangements at district and school levels. As indicated 
by Daun (2002) this led to expansion of power of one party, in this 
case the district education office. This also seems to indicate that 
central government officials did not really believe in local capacity and 
commitment at district and school levels, so they released the decree to 
slow the pace of decentralisation (McGinn and Welsh, 1999). It appears 
that by being brief and unclear in the decree’s content, a minimum 
JURNAL-vol-2.indd   64 6/4/2010   13:47:08
65
JissH Volume two, 2009
effect is preferred and a slower decentralisation process is desired 
(Wirt et al., 1985). These criticisms relate to descriptions of how the 
institution, the education council, will play its role and functions, and 
fulfil their mandates. The societal expectations of the decrees have 
not materialised, because of the the ill-conceived nature of the decree 
as well as inadequate capacities at the district level to implement the 
policy. 
The views and perspectives at the district level about education autonomy, 
where key stakeholders who held authority and could make substantial 
changes to SBM still had not utilised their power and influence (see, 
for example, Rondinelli et al., 1983). Knowledge and skills needed 
to facilitate school autonomy were not comprehensively understood 
(Rideout and Ural, 1993); rather, practices of power and self-interest 
were dominant. Consequently, the future of SBM looks bleak. These 
research findings point to the need for education of the local legislators 
and executives about SBM as a top priority. Improving the capacity of 
district education officials in general will lead to much more effective 
ways to support education councils and schools. In fact, devolved power 
in education given to the district can be customised according to local 
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